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a Board’S dUTY To MoNiTor
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 One of the most difficult questions in corporate law is whether the board of 
directors has a duty to prevent harm to the corporation. Delaware courts have 
refrained from holding boards of directors responsible for harmful outcomes that do 
not involve wrongful or illegal acts.1 By doing so, however, Delaware courts have 
encouraged boards to be uninformed of aggressive risk-taking by officers. Sometimes 
this risk-taking has detrimental effects on shareholders. The absence of adequate 
board oversight is partially to blame for the recent catastrophic losses suffered by 
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Citigroup.
 For example, at the height of the housing-price bubble in early 2005, Citigroup’s 
board decided that more of the firm’s capital should be invested in securities and 
derivatives that promised higher returns.2 Investments in mortgage products proved 
especially lucrative. When the housing-price bubble began def lating in 2007, 
Citigroup faced enormous losses. By October 2007, Citigroup wrote down $1.4 
billion of its f inance commitments.3 Citigroup eventually disclosed owning 
approximately $306 billion in troubled assets and reported losses of over $65 billion.4 
In late 2008, the firm submitted to two government rescue packages, and its 
shareholders bore heavy losses.5
 Six months after initially disclosing its financial problems, Citigroup announced 
it was seeking new directors who possessed “expertise in finance and investments.”6 
The tacit admission that the then-current board members did not possess the skills 
to fully understand the firm’s financial and investment decisions prompts the 
1. This paper focuses on the duty to monitor in Delaware because it is the state of incorporation of most 
U.S. public companies. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 
J.L. & Econ. 383, 391 (2003) (providing statistics of most popular jurisdictions of incorporation for 
U.S. companies).
2. Ken Brown & David Enrich, Rubin, Under Fire, Defends His Role at Citi, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 2008, at 
A1; Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 23, 2008, at A1.
3. Citigroup Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 99.1 (Oct. 1, 2007).
4. Citigroup Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 99.1 (Nov. 26, 2008); Dash & Creswell, supra note 2.
5. See Citigroup Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 26, 2008) (announcing $40 billion capital benefit 
provided by U.S. Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board and Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation); Citigroup Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 30, 2008) (announcing sale of $25 
billion in preferred stock and warrants to the U.S. Treasury Department); see also David Einrich, et al., 
U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 2008, at A1. Citigroup’s share price fell 
eighty-six percent between December 31, 2004, and December 31, 2008. On December 31, 2004, 
Citigroup’s stock was trading at $48.18 per share. On December 31, 2008, Citigroup’s stock was trading 
at $6.71 per share. Yahoo Finance, Historical Prices for Citigroup, Inc., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp
?s=C&a=11&b=31&c=2004&d=11&e=31&f=2008&g=d&z=66&y=990 (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
6. Citigroup Director Search, http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/directorsearch.htm 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2010); see also Eric Dash, Dean of Harvard Business School May Join Citigroup’s Board, 
N.Y. Times, July 9, 2008, at C2 (noting that, except for a recent addition to the board, none of Citigroup’s 
independent directors had substantial finance experience).
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question: Did the board do its job?7 The answer depends on whether one believes the 
board had a duty to understand and monitor the firm’s investments.
 Some notable business commentators argued that the boards of Citigroup and 
similarly devastated firms breached their duty to monitor.8 These critics accused the 
boards of violating a “clear-cut fiduciary responsibility to provide oversight.”9 If the 
boards had understood and monitored the firm’s investments and other risk-taking 
activities, perhaps the catastrophic losses suffered by these firms could have been 
prevented. Delaware courts, however, have taken a different view. In In re Citigroup 
Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed an 
attempt to hold the Citigroup board liable for the firm’s losses, finding that the 
board did not breach any of its fiduciary obligations.10
 Why did the court excuse the Citigroup board? The court applied a fiduciary 
standard set by two landmark Delaware decisions: the 1996 Court of Chancery 
decision In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation, which established 
the basic duties of the board to monitor corporate acts; 11 and the 2006 Delaware 
Supreme Court decision Stone v. Ritter, which reconceived the Caremark duties to be 
consistent with the duty of good faith and loyalty.12 Per Stone, directors breach their 
duty to monitor when they either “utterly fail[] to implement any reporting or 
information system or controls” or if “having implemented such systems or controls, 
consciously fail[] to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from 
being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”13 This standard poses 
three challenges for plaintiffs. First, they must show scienter—that the board acted 
with actual or constructive knowledge that its inaction would harm the corporation. 
Second, the board is responsible only for preventing wrongful or illegal acts. The 
board has no responsibility to prevent acts that are legal, but that lead to harmful 
7. See Paul L. Lee, Risk Management and the Role of the Board of Directors: Regulatory Expectations and 
Shareholder Actions, 125 Banking L.J. 679, 680 (2008) (predicting that shareholder litigants “will seek 
to charge the boards of directors in derivative actions with a failure to monitor and oversee the risk 
management processes for those [financial] institutions that have announced large losses.”).
8. See, e.g., Paul Myners, Comment, Banking Reform Must Begin in Boardroom, Fin. Times, Apr. 24, 2008 
(“[B]oard members should never forget that the most vital part of their job is to challenge executives.”); 
John Schnatter, Editorial, Where Were the Boards?, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 2008, at A11 (“[Boards of 
directors] have a clear-cut fiduciary responsibility to provide oversight. . . . Behind the CEO of every 
Freddie Mac, Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers who led their company down a path toward financial 
ruin, there was a board of directors that sat by silently and let it happen.”); Review & Outlook, Citi’s 
Taxpayer Parachute: Why are Robert Rubin and Other Directors Still Employed?, Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 
2008, at A14 (“‘Citi never sleeps,’ says the bank’s advertising slogan. But its directors apparently do. . . . 
Such a record of persistent failure suggests a larger—you might even call it ‘systemic’—management 
problem . . . .”).
9. Schnatter, supra note 8.
10. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
11. In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
12. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
13. Id. at 370.
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business results. Third, they cannot seek to hold boards responsible for monitoring 
the outcomes of previous board decisions.
 This article explains how Delaware courts have defined a board’s duty to monitor. 
In addition to reviewing the foundational cases that define the Delaware duty to 
monitor, this article also reviews several recent Delaware cases involving plaintiff 
shareholders challenging a board’s failure to prevent harm to the corporation. These 
cases, applying the Stone standard, reveal that the Delaware approach to the duty to 
monitor does not require boards to play a role in managing risk or otherwise monitor 
corporate activities that may result in harm to a corporation’s business. Such a weak 
fiduciary standard places Delaware jurisprudence in conflict with recent calls for 
boards to play a more active role in risk management.14
ii. thE fidUCiarY dUtY tO MOnitOr
 The duty to monitor is an obligation to prevent harm to the corporation. The 
board may breach its duty when harm occurs due to the board’s inattention or 
inaction.15 The scope of the duty depends on two elements: the care that must be 
taken by the board to detect possible harm, and the types of harm that require board 
intervention.
 Subjecting a board to liability for any harm to the corporation due to its inattention 
or inaction may cause a board to become risk averse, which could harm shareholders 
in two ways. First, the board may overinvest in monitoring and control mechanisms 
to limit the degree of risk assumed by the corporation. Second, the board may reject 
shareholder-enhancing business decisions that involve greater risk. Recognizing the 
chilling effect that the threat of legal liability may have on a board’s business 
judgment, Delaware courts have sought to limit the scope of the duty to monitor. 
The current standard for breach of the duty to monitor exposes directors to possible 
14. E.g., Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, Enterprise 
Risk Management—Integrated Framework 6–7 (2004) (“The board should ensure it is apprised 
of the most significant risks, along with actions management is taking and how it is ensuring effective 
enterprise risk management. The board should consider seeking input from internal auditors, external 
auditors, and others.”), available at http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/COSO_ERM_
ExecutiveSummary.pdf; Senior Supervisors Group, Risk Management Lessons from the Global 
Banking Crisis of 2008 22–23 (2009) (noting board direction and senior management oversight as 
areas for firms to improve risk management), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/
banking/2009/SSG_report.pdf. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission is a private organization sponsored by the five leading U.S. accounting associations 
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), American Accounting Association 
(AAA), Financial Executives International (FEI), Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and Institute of 
Management Accountants (IMA)) that provides guidance on corporate governance and internal 
controls. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, supra. The 
Senior Supervisors Group expresses the views of financial supervisors from the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Board, French Banking Commission, German Financial Supervisory Agency, Japanese Financial 
Services Agency, Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, and U.K. Financial Services Authority. 
Senior Supervisors Group, supra.
15. See William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman & Guhan Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases 
on the Law of Business Organization 261–62 (3d ed. 2009).
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liability if they fail to act in the face of a red f lag or when inaction leads to legal 
violations.16
 This article explores how Delaware courts developed these limits and whether 
the limits are appropriate. The three cases that established the duty to monitor are 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone. Graham held that a board has a duty 
to act when it becomes aware of illegal or wrongful activities.17 Caremark explained 
why a board has an obligation not only to act in the face of obvious signs of 
wrongdoing, but also to be informed and be vigilant for wrongdoing.18 Stone limited 
the Caremark standard by incorporating the duty to monitor into the duty of good 
faith and loyalty.19 Thus, a board’s liability for failing to monitor is conditioned upon 
proof of scienter, a key element to finding lack of good faith.
 An examination of these core cases and their progeny illustrates that the link 
between the duty to monitor and the duty of good faith and loyalty is a tortured one.
 A. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.: Beware of Red Flags
 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. was the first Delaware case to 
recognize a board’s duty to prevent corporate misconduct.20 Allis-Chalmers’s 
shareholders sued the board for failing to stop employees from violating federal 
antitrust law.21 The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the claim, noting that the 
board was entitled to depend on the “honesty and integrity” of the corporation’s 
employees.22 However, the court acknowledged a fiduciary duty to monitor and made 
three basic points about the duty. First, the court subsumed the duty to monitor 
within the duty of care, which arises from a board’s control over the management of 
a corporation.23
 Second, the court defined the duty as a passive duty. Citing for support the 
nineteenth century U.S. Supreme Court decision Briggs v. Spaulding,24 the Delaware 
16. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart 
Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 971 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Baxter Int’l, 654 A.2d 
1268, 1270–71 (Del. Ch. 1995).
17. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
18. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
19. Stone, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
20. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
21. Id. at 127.
22. Id. at 130.
23. Id. (“[The directors’] duties are those of control, and whether or not by neglect they have made 
themselves liable for failure to exercise proper control depends on the circumstances and facts of the 
particular case.”).
24. 141 U.S. 132 (1891). In Briggs, the receiver of the First National Bank of Buffalo sued the directors of 
the bank for failing to pay adequate attention to the affairs of the bank; specifically, the receiver alleged 
that the directors failed to hold meetings, appoint any committees of examination, make examinations 
in person into the conduct and management of the affairs of the bank, or supervise executive officers. 
The suit alleged that the failure to supervise permitted misconduct by management that contributed to 
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Supreme Court ruled that boards were responsible for halting misconduct only if 
“something occurs to put them on suspicion that something is wrong.”25 Boards did 
not have an obligation to watch for misconduct. Instead, boards would be liable only 
if they “ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of 
employee wrongdoing.”26 The court further refused to impose any “duty upon the 
directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out 
wrongdoing.”27 Rather, the court decided that the monitoring duty should be defined 
by what boards could not help but see, as opposed to what they should have seen if 
they had made a reasonable effort at monitoring.28 Consequently, Graham gave boards 
little incentive to monitor.29 A board that made an effort to be better informed would 
only expose itself to potential liability.
 Third, boards only have a duty to stop corporate actions that are illegal. The 
description of the board’s duty as exercising appropriate control could have justified a 
broader application of the duty. The court, however, did not consider whether a 
board’s duty extended to preventing bad business outcomes or other harmful results 
not involving violations of the law. It was within this doctrinal framework that the 
Delaware Court of Chancery reconsidered the duty to monitor thirty-three years 
later in Caremark.
 B. In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation: A Duty to Monitor
 Chancellor William Allen’s opinion in In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative 
Litigation remains the most complete exploration by a Delaware court of the meaning 
the bank’s downfall. Id. at 135–37. The Supreme Court determined that directors exercised ordinary 
care and prudence and exercised reasonable supervision over the bank’s managers. While the managers 
may have been guilty of mismanagement, the Court concluded that the board’s failure to know of (and, 
therefore, to prevent) such acts of wrongdoing was not the result of “gross inattention.” Id. at 165–66.
25. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
26. Id. (emphasis added). Such obvious signs constitute “red flags” that demand board action. See In re Citigroup 
Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jun. 5, 2003) (“‘Red f lags’ are only 
useful when they are either waved in one’s face or displayed so that they are visible to the careful 
observer.”).
27. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
28. Id.
 If he has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, has 
refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored either 
willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law will 
cast the burden of liability upon him. This is not the case at bar, however, for as soon as 
it became evident that there were grounds for suspicion, the Board acted promptly to 
end it and prevent its recurrence.
Id. (emphasis added).
29. The board could either signal to company employees not to present any troubling information or, 
alternatively, employees of the company could withhold information from the board to protect the board 
from possible liability. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical 
View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1099 (1977).
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of the duty to monitor,30 so much so that duty to monitor claims are often referred to 
today as “Caremark claims.”31 Caremark originated from a federal investigation of 
Caremark International employees who made illegal payments to physicians in 
exchange for patient referrals.32 Caremark paid out approximately $250 million to 
settle the charges.33 In approving the derivative settlement, Allen took the opportunity 
to discuss whether the Caremark board had breached its duty to monitor by allowing 
the violations to occur.
 Allen believed that boards have an obligation to invest in monitoring systems to 
identify legal violations. No longer could boards blissfully assume that the corporation 
was operating in complete compliance with the law. A board has a “duty to attempt 
in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the 
board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances 
may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance 
with applicable legal standards.”34 Finding a violation of this duty, however, would 
not be easy: the board must have failed to provide reasonable oversight in a “sustained 
or systematic” fashion.35 A sustained or systematic failure of oversight would include 
an “utter failure” by the board to make certain that a reasonable information-reporting 
system was functioning.36 Actual failure to prevent wrongdoing, however, does not 
in itself mean that the system was unreasonable or that the board utterly failed in 
ensuring that a reasonable system was in place. The court would need to consider 
both the design of the system and the board’s role in reviewing the design of the 
system.37
 In Caremark, the company ran training programs and distributed ethics manuals 
to its employees.38 The board also reviewed the company’s legal compliance systems 
even after outside auditors found no material weaknesses in the systems.39 Allen 
concluded that the board had made a good faith attempt to ensure compliance with 
the law.40
30. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
31. E.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re Career 
Educ. Corp. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 1398-VCP, 2007 WL 2875202, at *5–7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 
2007). Hillary Sale has called Caremark “one of the most prominent Delaware opinions of all time.” 
Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 719, 719–20 (2007).
32. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 962.
33. Id. at 960–61. 
34. Id. at 970.
35. Id. at 971. 
36. Id.
37. Id. at 970.
38. In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 963 (Del. Ch. 1996).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 971–72.
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 The burden on boards to put into place information-reporting systems went 
beyond what Graham contemplated, raising the question whether Allen ignored the 
earlier Delaware Supreme Court decision. But Allen questioned whether, thirty-
three years after Graham, the Delaware Supreme Court still would believe that 
boards could justify not making some effort to ensure it collected information 
“respecting material acts, events or conditions within the corporation, including 
compliance with applicable statutes and regulations.”41 He offered three reasons why 
Graham should be reinterpreted and, in doing so, provided the rationale for a more 
substantial duty to monitor.
 First, Allen noted that since Graham, the Delaware Supreme Court had 
recognized the “seriousness” of boards’ role in the management of corporations.42 He 
specifically cited to the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith v. Van Gorkom43 
and Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, Inc.44 as evidence of this change.45 
In Van Gorkom and QVC, Delaware courts held boards to a higher standard of review, 
requiring boards to demonstrate that they engaged in reasonable investigation and 
deliberation before approving certain corporate transactions.46
 Second, Allen argued that information-reporting systems are essential to boards 
fulfilling their supervisory and monitoring role under section 141 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law (“DGCL”)—the statutory provision stating that the 
corporation shall be managed by the direction of the board.47 Allen’s linking of the 
operation of information-reporting systems to DGCL section 141 is consistent with 
the notion that a board can only manage the corporation if it has a means of collecting 
information.
41. Id. at 969. 
42. Id. at 970.
43. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
44. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
45. In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). In Van Gorkom, the 
Delaware Supreme Court found the board to be grossly negligent and without the protection of the 
business judgment rule when it approved the sale of the corporation without a substantial inquiry into 
the terms of the offer. 488 A.2d at 874. In QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court decided that the board 
breached its duty under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), 
by failing to obtain the best price for the company in a change of control transaction. QVC, 637 A.2d at 
51.
46. See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858; QVC, 637 A.2d 34.
47. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. DGCL section 141(a) states:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise 
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such provision is 
made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or imposed 
upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such 
extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the certif icate of 
incorporation.
 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). 
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 Caremark was a complex enterprise. It had 7000 employees divided into ninety 
different branches and a decentralized management structure.48 The complexity of 
the firm made it difficult for Caremark’s board to monitor all aspects of the firm 
without an information-reporting system.49 Thus, Caremark represented a shift in 
how Delaware courts viewed the role of corporate boards: boards would be subject to 
a more literal interpretation of DGCL section 141 and be held responsible for the 
actions of corporate officers and employees.50
 Third, Allen believed that any rational board would install an information-
reporting system to take advantage of the benefits offered corporations under the 
federal organizational sentencing guidelines.51 Pursuant to the guidelines, a judge 
may decide to lower a fine on a corporation for unlawful acts if she determines that 
the corporation had in place an “effective program to prevent and detect violations of 
law.”52 Consequently, the guidelines “offer powerful incentives for corporations today 
to have in place compliance programs.”53
48. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 962.
49. It is worth noting that the Delaware Supreme Court did not apply the same reasoning in Graham. Allis-
Chalmers also was an extremely complex company, if not more so than Caremark. Allis-Chalmers had 
over 30,000 employees with operations across the United States. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 
188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court considered the enormity of 
Allis-Chalmers’ operations not to impose a duty on the board to put into place a system to monitor the 
vast corporate enterprise but rather to justify the board relying to a greater extent on the honesty and 
responsiveness of the company’s management and employees. Graham, 188 A.2d. at 130.
 By force of necessity, the company’s Directors could not know personally all the 
company’s employees. The very magnitude of the enterprise required them to confine 
their control to the broad policy decisions. That they did this is clear from the record. 
At the meetings of the Board in which all Directors participated, these questions were 
considered and decided on the basis of summaries, reports and corporate records. These 
they were entitled to rely on, not only, we think, under general principles of the common 
law, but by reason of 8 Del.C. § 141(f) as well, which in terms fully protects a director 
who relies on such in the performance of his duties.
 Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
50. The need for information systems is even greater today as corporations continue to grow in size and 
complexity. See, e.g., Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law 58 (2d ed. 
2007) (discussing complexity of modern U.S. corporations).
51. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
52. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C4.11 (2009).
53. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969; see also Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 697, 703 (2002) (describing 
the incentive that corporations have under the guidelines to implement compliance programs). Even 
after the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), declared aspects of the 
sentencing guidelines unconstitutional, the sentencing guidelines remain very inf luential. See Paul 
Fiorelli & Ann Marie Tracey, Why Comply? Organizational Guidelines Offer a Safe Harbor in the Storm, 
32 J. Corp. L. 467, 475–78 (2007) (“Even if the logic and the holding of the Supreme Court in Booker 
also applies to corporations, organizations should still consider compliance and ethics programs to be 
good investments.”). The impact of the sentencing guidelines also plays a bigger role in the pre-charge 
stage of corporate prosecutions when prosecutors negotiate deferred and non-prosecution agreements to 
corporations in return for governance reform. See Peter J. Henning, The Organizational Guidelines: 
R.I.P.?, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 312, 312–14 (2007). The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual continues to 
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 Prior to Caremark, Delaware courts expected little board involvement in the day-
to-day work of the corporation, looking to the board only in the case of fundamental 
or self-dealing transactions. Pre-Caremark case law, during which time the Graham 
decision was the controlling law, perpetuated a CEO-centric model of corporate 
governance with little obligation on boards to supervise officers and employees. 
Caremark gave more substance to the duty to monitor.54 Taken to its logical extension, 
Caremark placed the burden on boards both to establish and evaluate the adequacy of 
its internal control and information-reporting systems and to consider the legal and 
economic environment of the corporation. At least that is how companies and their 
legal advisers responded to Caremark until the Delaware courts limited the duty to 
monitor in Stone v. Ritter.55
 C. Reconceiving the Duty to Monitor as part of the Duty of Good Faith and Loyalty
 The Delaware Supreme Court’s response to the Chancery Court’s Caremark 
decision came ten years later in Stone v. Ritter. Although the court adopted Chancellor 
Allen’s reasoning in Caremark (including his reinterpretation of Graham), it cut back 
the scope of the Caremark standard by redefining the duty to monitor as part of the 
duty of good faith and loyalty.56 Thus, Stone effectively limited the scope of the duty 
to monitor.
direct prosecutors to take into account “the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing 
compliance program.” U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 9-28.300(A)(5) (2008), available at http://www.justice.
gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm. The SEC also rewards corporations that 
seek out and report wrongdoing. The SEC policy, articulated in the Seaboard Report, grants corporations 
better enforcement treatment for, among other things, self-reporting misconduct. See Report of the 
Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission 
Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act 
Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001). 
54. See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 265, 266–67 (1997) (citing Caremark to 
support the statement: “Courts have embraced the model of an activist board and are indicating their 
willingness to impose liability on directors who fail to research, investigate, and ask challenging 
questions. No longer can independent directors rubber-stamp management recommendations without 
mastering the financial details of proposed transactions.”).
55. See, e.g., Eric Landau, Shawn Harpen & Krisel A. Massey, Revisiting Caremark and a Director’s Duty to 
Monitor: The Chancery Court’s Wake-up Call to Directors, 1418 PLI/Corp 37, 54 (2004) (“While Caremark 
may not have had the wide-ranging impact envisioned by some, and may actually have been overtaken 
by rules and regulations imposed by Congress, the SEC and self-regulatory organizations, it still has 
served a wake-up call to corporate America[,] emphasiz[ing] the need for increased monitoring of 
corporate affairs to catch problems before they get out of hand . . . .”); Sherrie McAvoy & Carole L. 
Basri, After Caremark: Personal Liability for Director’s Failure to Implement Corporate Compliance Programs 
and the Need for Self-Assessment, 1057 PLI/Corp 35, 37 (1998) (“Failure of directors to promote adequate 
corporate programs within the corporation could lead to personal liability for losses due to such failure 
to provide appropriate corporate compliance programs. This concept of liability expands the director’s 
responsibility beyond the traditional obligations of the duty of care and the countervailing concept of 
the business judgment rule.”).
56. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 368–70 (Del. 2006).
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 The Stone court limited the duty to monitor in three ways: first, the court equated 
the duty to monitor with the duty of good faith;57 second, the court subsumed the 
duty of good faith into the duty of loyalty (Allen considered the duty to monitor to 
be part of the duty of care58);59and third, the court interpreted scienter as an element 
of bad faith.60 While re-categorization of the duty to monitor as part of the duty of 
loyalty removed monitoring failures from DGCL section 102(b)(7) exculpation, 
re-characterization also made it more difficult to show that directors breached their 
duty to monitor.61
 To understand why the Delaware Supreme Court limited the duty to monitor, it 
is necessary first to examine the Delaware courts’ earlier struggle to define the duty 
of good faith. While the Delaware Supreme Court finally agreed upon a formulation 
of the meaning of good faith in the Disney cases,62 the court failed to answer all 
questions about the status of good faith relative to the duties of care and loyalty. This 
doctrinal uncertainty ultimately led the Delaware Supreme Court to apply its new 
formulation of good faith to a Caremark claim in Stone.
57. Id.
58. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
59. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70.
60. Id. at 370 (“[I]mposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not 
discharging their fiduciary obligations. . . . a conscious disregard for their responsibilities.”). In later 
cases, the Delaware courts have confirmed the scienter element. See, e.g., Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 
141 (Del. 2008) (“Where, as here, directors are exculpated from liability except for claims based on 
‘fraudulent,’ ‘illegal ’ or ‘bad faith’ conduct, a plaintiff must also plead particularized facts that 
demonstrate that the directors acted with scienter . . . .”).
61. DGCL section 102(b)(7) states:
 [T]he certif icate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the following 
matters: . . . . (7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director 
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty 
as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a 
director: (i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its 
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any 
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit. No such 
provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act or omission 
occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective. All references in this 
paragraph to a director shall also be deemed to refer (x) to a member of the governing 
body of a corporation which is not authorized to issue capital stock, and (y) to such 
other person or persons, if any, who, pursuant to a provision of the certificate of 
incorporation in accordance with § 141(a) of this title, exercise or perform any of the 
powers or duties otherwise conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this 
title.
 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). A similar provision exists in the Model Business Corporation 
Act. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.02(b)(4) (2006). 
62. The Delaware Supreme Court extended itself to examine the issue because it recognized the confusion 
generated by the term good faith. See Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006) (“Because of the 
increased recognition of the importance of good faith, some conceptual guidance to the corporate 
community may be helpful.”).
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  1. The Disney Cases and the Meaning of Good Faith
 In the Disney cases, shareholders sued the Walt Disney Company board of 
directors for its handling of the hiring and firing of Disney President Michael 
Ovitz.63 After serving little more than one year at Disney, Mr. Ovitz received salary, 
stock options, and severance totaling approximately $140 million.64
 The plaintiffs argued that the board did not exercise an appropriate degree of 
care and diligence in approving the various transactions between the company and 
Mr. Ovitz.65 At trial it became clear that, despite the importance of his position and 
the amount of compensation and severance he received, most of the Disney directors 
had little involvement in either the negotiation of Mr. Ovitz’s employment or the 
terms of his departure.66
 Disney, however, had a DGCL section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision in its 
certificate of incorporation.67 To bypass DGCL section 102(b)(7), plaintiffs argued 
that the board handled Mr. Ovitz’s employment not in good faith.68 However, at the 
time there was not a clear understanding in Delaware law as to the meaning of good 
63. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998) (dismissal of original complaint); 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (partial reversal of dismissal); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (refusal of motion to dismiss) [hereinafter Disney I]; In 
re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005) (decision on the merits) [hereinafter 
Disney II]; Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (affirmation of lower court decision).
64. Disney I, 825 A.2d at 278–79.
65. Id. at 278.
66. The decision recounts in great detail the facts of the board’s involvement in the hiring and termination 
of Mr. Ovitz. The court recognized that only three members of the board were involved in negotiating 
the details of Mr. Ovtiz’s employment agreement. Disney II, 907 A.2d at 702–09. Likewise, the board 
allowed Michael Eisner to negotiate almost all of the terms of Mr. Ovitz’s termination. Id. at 724–40.
67. Disney I, 825 A.2d at 286. The Delaware legislature added DGCL section 102(b)(7) in 1986 in response 
to the decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), the only case where a Delaware court 
held directors liable for breach of the duty of care. The legislative synopsis of the 1986 amendment 
stated:
Section 102(b)(7) and the amendments in Section 145 represent a legislative response to 
recent changes in the market for directors’ liability insurance . . . . Recent changes in 
that market, including the unavailability of the traditional policies . . . have threatened 
the quality and stability of the governance of Delaware corporations because directors, 
have become unwilling, and in many instances, may be deterred by the unavailability of 
insurance from making entrepreneurial decisions. The amendments are intended to 
allow Delaware corporations to provide substitute protection, in various forms, to their 
directors and to limit director liability under certain circumstances.
 1 Folk on Delaware General Corporation Law § 102.15 n.53 (5th ed. 2008). R. Franklin Balotti, 
one of the drafters of the text of DGCL section 102(b)(7), later explained that the exception for acts not 
in good faith was part of a “belts and suspenders” approach to ensure that the section did not shield a 
director from liability for acts beyond duty of care violations. Leo Strine, Lawrence Hamermesh, R. 
Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation 
Law (Feb. 26, 2009) Geo. L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 40–44) (Widener Law School Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 09-13; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 630), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349971.
68. Disney I, 825 A.2d at 278. 
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faith. Ambiguous drafting of DGCL section 102(b)(7) and references to a duty of 
good faith in earlier Delaware cases gave the impression that good faith was either an 
independent fiduciary duty that stood alongside the duties of care and loyalty or was 
a means of measuring the degree of success that a fiduciary achieved in meeting her 
duty of care. Previous Delaware cases appeared to recognize a “triad” of fiduciary 
duties consisting of the duties of good faith, care, and loyalty.69 For many 
commentators, recognition of an independent duty of good faith was desirable in 
order to hold directors and officers accountable for certain acts that did not constitute 
classic cases of disloyalty, but were so egregious that they should be beyond DGCL 
section 102(b)(7) exculpation.70 Despite efforts to the contrary, the meaning and 
status of the duty of good faith remained elusive.71
 In Disney I and Disney II, Chancellor William B. Chandler III attempted to 
define bad faith as an “intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s 
responsibilities.”72 He further stated that directors act in bad faith when they 
“consciously and intentionally disregard[] their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t 
care about the risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate decision.”73
 The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed Chandler’s formulations. In Brehm v. 
Eisner, the final Disney case, the Delaware Supreme Court considered three possible 
categories of bad faith. The first category of bad faith conduct is conduct with intent 
to do harm.74 There was no question that such conduct constituted bad faith.75 A 
second category is gross negligence without intent to do harm.76 As gross negligence 
was well understood as a violation of the duty of care,77 the court reasoned that gross 
69. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (“The directors of Delaware 
corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good faith.”); Malone v. 
Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (“The director’s fiduciary duty both to the corporation and its 
shareholders has been characterized by this Court as a triad: due care, good faith, and loyalty.”); Cede 
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (“[A] shareholder plaintiff assumes the 
burden of providing evidence that directors . . . breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty—
good faith, loyalty, or due care.” (emphasis added)). 
70. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (2006); 
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456 (2004). 
71. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law 
Jurisprudence, 55 Duke L.J. 1 (2005).
72. Disney II, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005). The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that both 
definitions were substantively the same definition (i.e., intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious 
disregard for one’s responsibilities). See Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27, 63 (Del. 2006) (“Both formulations 
[of bad faith] express the same concept, although in slightly different language.”).
73. Disney I, 825 A.2d at 289.
74. Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006).
75. Id. (“That such conduct constitutes classic, quintessential bad faith is a proposition so well accepted in 
the liturgy of fiduciary law that it borders on axiomatic.”).
76. Id.
77. See McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1273–74 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“Delaware’s current understanding 
of gross negligence is conduct that constitutes reckless indifference or actions that are without the 
bounds of reason.” (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 65, 67)). 
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negligence could not be bad faith since a director either was protected from personal 
liability for acts of gross negligence by DGCL section 102(b)(7), or enjoyed 
indemnification for such acts under DGCL section 145.78 The tough case is the third 
category, “which falls in between the first two categories of (1) conduct motivated by 
subjective bad intent and (2) conduct resulting from gross negligence.”79 In the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s view, Chandler’s definition of bad faith—intentional 
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities—fit this last 
category.80
 In trying to distinguish between the duty of good faith and duty of care, the 
Delaware Supreme Court defined bad faith in terms of an extremely severe form of 
carelessness (i.e., greater than gross negligence):
Cases have arisen where corporate directors have no conflicting self-interest 
in a decision, yet engage in misconduct that is more culpable than simple 
inattention or failure to be informed of all facts material to the decision. To 
protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, fiduciary conduct 
of this kind, which does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is 
qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence, should be proscribed. A vehicle 
is needed to address such violations doctrinally, and that doctrinal vehicle is 
the duty to act in good faith.81
What the court did not resolve was whether the duty of good faith was independent 
of both the duties of care and loyalty, or, alternatively, whether good faith was an 
egregious duty of care violation. The court expressly refrained from addressing the 
issue.82
 In adopting Chandler’s definition of lack of good faith (“intentionally fails to act 
in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his 
duties”), the Delaware Supreme Court noted that its understanding of good faith 
was consistent with earlier decisions. The court particularly zeroed in on Caremark ’s 
reference to good faith: “a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise 
78. Brehm, 906 A.2d at 66 (“There is no basis in policy, precedent or common sense that would justify 
dismantling the distinction between gross negligence and bad faith.”); see also, e.g., Rothenberg v. Santa 
Fe Pac. Corp., Civ. A. No. 11749, 1992 WL 111206, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 18, 1992) (noting that DGCL 
section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability for gross negligence). Invocation of DGCL section 
102(b)(7) in the face of a duty of care claim would be grounds for immediate dismissal of the claim. 
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223–24 (Del. 1999). DGCL section 145 authorizes 
corporations to indemnify officers and directors against any expenses (and, in some cases, judgment 
costs) incurred by such persons in defending themselves against lawsuits concerning their corporate 
service. Del. Code Ann. tit 8, § 145 (2001).
79. Brehm, 906 A.2d at 66.
80. Id. at 66–67.
81. Id. at 66 (emphasis added). The Delaware Supreme Court also quoted with approval Chandler’s earlier 
description of good faith, a description that further gave the impression that good faith was distinct 
from care and loyalty: “The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes not simply the duties 
of care and loyalty, in the narrow sense that I have discussed them above, but all actions required by a 
true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.” Id. at 67. 
82. Id. at 67 n.112.
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oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and 
reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary 
condition to liability.”83 Thus, the Brehm court reinterpreted Caremark, a case 
originally decided on duty of care grounds, as a case about the duty of good faith.
  2. Stone v. Ritter
 In deciding Stone less than five months after Brehm,84 the Delaware Supreme 
Court grasped the opportunity to settle once and for all the meaning of the duty of 
good faith. Since Stone involved a Caremark claim, it also represented the first 
opportunity for the court to opine on the duty to monitor standard since Graham and 
Caremark.
 Stone was a derivative suit brought by shareholders of AmSouth Bancorporation 
against the board for allowing employees to violate reporting requirements under 
various banking and anti-money-laundering regulations.85 As AmSouth’s certificate 
of incorporation included a DGCL section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision, plaintiffs 
attempted to characterize the failure to monitor as an act of bad faith.86 The Delaware 
Supreme Court rejected that claim.87 The company had in place a comprehensive 
information-reporting system designed by the board.88 Even though the program 
proved to be f lawed, the court found that the board pursued its monitoring 
responsibilities in good faith.89
 In holding that the AmSouth directors pursued their monitoring responsibilities 
in good faith, the Delaware Supreme Court first upheld Chancellor Allen’s 
interpretation of Graham—eliminating any doubt that Allen’s decision in Caremark 
83. Id. at 67 n.111 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 963 (Del. Ch. 1996)) 
(emphasis added). The Delaware Supreme Court refused to answer the question whether a violation of 
the duty of good faith could serve as an independent basis for directors’ liability, leaving unanswered 
whether good faith really is a third legal duty of a triad of fiduciary duties. Id. at 67 n.112.
84. The Delaware Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Brehm, 906 A.2d 27, on June 8, 2006 and 
delivered its opinion in Stone, 911 A.2d 362, on November 6, 2006.
85. Prosecutors uncovered AmSouth’s reporting failures when they discovered AmSouth custodial accounts 
being used in a Ponzi scheme. Stone, 911 A.2d at 365. As a result, AmSouth Bancorporation and its 
subsidiary, AmSouth Bank, had to pay $50 million in fines and civil penalties. Id. Regulators also 
ordered AmSouth to improve its compliance programs. Id. at 366. The Delaware Supreme Court 
recognized the derivative complaint as a “classic Caremark claim.” Id. at 364.
86. Stone. v. Ritter, No. Civ.A. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2006) (referring to the 
plaintiffs argument in the answering brief that demand should be excused because the board failed to 
make a good faith attempt to fulfill its fiduciary duties); see also Stone, 911 A.2d at 367 (“Critical to this 
demand excused argument is the fact that the directors’ potential personal liability depends upon 
whether or not their conduct can be exculpated by the section 102(b)(7) provision contained in the 
AmSouth certificate of incorporation.”).
87. Stone, 911 A.2d at 373.
88. Id. at 371–73.
89. Id. at 372–73.
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was not good law.90 Even though Graham did not expressly require the board to make 
an effort to be informed of the activities of the corporation, the court agreed with 
Allen that boards had a duty to be reasonably informed and to ensure that corporate 
information-reporting systems were in place.91
 The court also made clear, however, that the failure of a board to meet its 
Caremark duty was a failure to act in good faith (as opposed to a violation of the duty 
of care, as determined by Allen).92 Furthermore, the court declared that the duty of 
good faith was a subsidiary element of the duty of loyalty.93 Whereas in Brehm the 
duty of good faith appeared to be a non-exculpable violation of the duty of care, the 
court in Stone f latly rejected this notion and the notion that the duty of good faith 
was independent from the duties of care and loyalty, ending the doctrinal debate 
about the existence of a triad of fiduciary duties.94
 In interpreting the duty to monitor, the Delaware Supreme Court relied heavily 
on the reasoning of Vice Chancellor Leo Strine in Guttman v. Huang.95 In Guttman, 
Strine considered a Caremark claim where a group of shareholders accused the board 
of failing to ensure accurate financial reporting.96 Even though Strine recognized 
that “by its plain and intentional terms” the Caremark standard for the duty to 
monitor was about the exercise of care by directors, he recast Caremark as a case 
about the duty of loyalty and the responsibility of directors to meet their duties in 
good faith.97 In his opinion, good faith was an essential element of the duty of 
loyalty—i.e., it is impossible for a director to act in bad faith and still be considered 
to have acted loyally to the corporation.98 Consequently, Strine argued that Caremark, 
despite its intent to encourage boards to exercise greater care, in fact set a standard 
that “requires a showing that the directors breached their duty of loyalty by failing to 
attend to their duties in good faith.”99
90. Id. at 370 (“We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director oversight 
liability . . . .”).
91. Id. at 369.
92. Id. (“[T]he Caremark standard for so-called ‘oversight’ liability draws heavily upon the concept of 
director failure to act in good faith.”).
93. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 368 (Del. 2006).
94. Id. at 370.
95. See id. at 370 (citing Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
96. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 505–06 (Del. Ch. 2003).
97. Id. at 506.
98. Id. at 506 n.34. Strine further argued that the Delaware legislature should redraft DGCL section 
102(b)(7) to make disloyal conduct the only exception to liability exculpation, eliminating once and for 
all any notion that good faith and legality of action were different from the duty of loyalty. See id. 
99. Id. at 506. See generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of 
Loyalty, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1769 (2007) (commenting on the awkward fit of the duty of good faith 
within the duty of loyalty). It is interesting to note that despite his strongly argued assertion that a 
breach of the duty to monitor is a breach of the duty of loyalty, Strine still recognized the connection 
between the duty to monitor and the duty of care even after deciding Guttman. See Teachers’ Ret. Sys. 
of La. v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654, 668 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“[T]he most difficult task of all: demonstrating 
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 Building upon Strine’s analysis in Guttman, the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Stone reformulated the Caremark standard as a two-part test where liability stems 
either from (a) “utterly fail[ing] to implement any reporting or information system or 
controls” or (b) if “having implemented such system or controls, consciously fail[ing] to 
monitor or oversee its operations.”100 Most notably, the court identified a scienter 
requirement to prove a breach of the duty to monitor, stating, “imposition of liability 
requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging their 
fiduciary obligations.”101 In order to show scienter, plaintiffs must plead “particularized 
facts . . . that [the directors] had ‘actual or constructive knowledge’ that their conduct 
was legally improper.”102 The court left unanswered how difficult it would be to 
satisfy that requirement.
 In sum, Stone, a decision that courts have interpreted as defining the appropriate 
scope of the duty to monitor, was in reality an attempt by the Delaware Supreme 
Court to end doctrinal confusion about the meaning of the duty of good faith and 
loyalty. However, because of its treatment by lower courts as a duty to monitor case, 
the decision, while clarifying one area of law, undermined the impact that the duty 
to monitor has on boards’ willingness to exercise oversight of corporate activities and 
places Delaware out of step with popular calls for more vigorous risk management by 
corporate boards.
 D. Duty to Monitor After Stone v. Ritter
 In the few years since Stone, courts have considered a handful of duty to monitor 
cases, providing some data points to consider how well the post-Stone standard 
encourages monitoring efforts by boards. In almost all cases, the courts reviewed duty 
to monitor claims as part of motions to dismiss, usually in the context of plaintiffs 
arguing demand futility103 by showing that directors faced a substantial likelihood of 
that the outside directors had breached their duty of care, not as a result of trying to do their job . . . but 
because the directors’ level of indolence was so extreme that it arose to a conscious decision to take the 
salary of a director while intentionally failing to discharge one’s fiduciary obligations.”).
100. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (emphasis added). In reformulating the Caremark 
standard, the court borrowed language from the definition of good faith—specifically the use of the 
word “conscious”—first set forth by Chancellor Chandler in Disney II as a “conscious disregard for one’s 
responsibilities.” Disney II, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005). Thus, there is an explicit connection 
between the duty to monitor standard set forth in Caremark and the duty of good faith standard set 
forth in the Disney cases.
101. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (citing Guttman, 833 A.2d at 506) (emphasis added); see also Wood v. Baum, 953 
A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) (“Where, as here, directors are exculpated from liability except for claims 
based on ‘fraudulent,’ ‘illegal’ or ‘bad faith’ conduct, a plaintiff must also plead particularized facts that 
demonstrate that the directors acted with scienter . . . .”); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 
(Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing a “scienter-based standard” in a monitoring context).
102. Wood, 953 A.2d at 141 (citation omitted); see also Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 (“[The Caremark standard] 
premises liability on a showing that the directors were conscious of the fact that they were not doing 
their jobs.”).
103. To initiate a derivative suit, a plaintiff makes a demand on the board to bring forward a claim on behalf 
of the corporation. A plaintiff may attempt to bring forward a derivative claim without the board’s 
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personal liability from the claims.104 In only one case did the parties fully litigate the 
merits of a duty to monitor claim. All other post-Stone cases either have focused on 
whether plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to meet the scienter requirement or, in the case 
of Citigroup, excuse the board from monitoring business risk.
 In several cases, plaintiffs have had difficulty demonstrating scienter. For 
example, Desimone v. Barrows concerned a derivative action against the directors of 
Sycamore Networks, Inc. for allowing the backdating of stock options.105 The 
plaintiff argued that the granting of the backdated stock options by certain officers 
was “an abdication of the board’s duty to monitor the corporation’s compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations.”106 In order to make a successful duty to monitor 
claim, however, Vice Chancellor Strine noted that the plaintiff had to plead the 
existence of facts suggesting both that the board actually knew that the internal 
controls of the corporation were inadequate in detecting the backdating, and that the 
board chose to ignore the inadequacies.107 The plaintiff could not do so. The best 
evidence of scienter the plaintiff could produce was the existence of an internal 
memorandum describing the backdating activities.108 The memorandum did not 
impress Strine, who noted that the plaintiff failed to show that the board knew of 
the contents of the memorandum.109
 The plaintiff in Desimone gave Strine very little evidence with which to evaluate 
the possible merits of the claim. The plaintiff sloppily prepared his pleading, making 
little effort to collect the necessary facts to support his assertions.110 Nonetheless, 
Strine’s discussion of the duty to monitor claim indicated what he expected the 
plaintiff to plead. The focus of the duty is on what the directors knew as opposed to 
what they should have known. Thus, the plaintiff could have succeeded only if he 
presented facts that demonstrated that the board actually knew of the deficiencies in 
its monitoring system or of the backdated stock options.111
 In another case, Wood v. Baum, the Delaware Supreme Court considered a duty to 
monitor claim against the board of directors of a limited liability company for failing to 
consent by claiming demand futility if the claim pertains to a board decision and the plaintiff can 
demonstrate a reasonable doubt that (i) the directors could be disinterested and independent or (ii) the 
challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment. Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984). If the claim does not pertain to a board decision, the plaintiff 
must only demonstrate a reasonable doubt that the board of directors could be disinterested and 
independent in considering the demand. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933–34 (Del. 1993).
104. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814–15.
105. 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007).
106. Id. at 939.
107. Id. at 940; see also id. at 942 (regarding potential liability of members of the audit committee).
108. Id. at 940.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 917–18 (describing the effort plaintiff put into his pleading as insubstantial).
111. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 940 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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maintain adequate accounting and financial-reporting controls.112 As in Desimone, the 
court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the directors knowingly 
participated in the illegal acts.113 The court rejected the plaintiff ’s argument that the 
directors had actual knowledge of the illegal acts because they either signed the publicly 
filed documents that contained misstatements, approved the transactions that later 
proved to be improper, or served on the audit committee that failed to catch the 
questionable accounting practices.114 The court affirmed that the directors’ lack of good 
faith could not be inferred based upon what they should have known or the many 
opportunities they had to discover the wrongful actions, but rather could only be 
inferred upon evidence that they knew of, or participated in, the illegal acts.115
 In three other cases, courts looked favorably on duty to monitor claims, but 
offered limited guidance to plaintiffs. ATR-Kim Eng Financial Corp. v. Araneta is the 
only case in which parties fully litigated a duty to monitor claim.116 The case involved 
a joint venture between ATR and Carlos Araneta in which Araneta controlled ninety 
percent of the joint venture company.117 ATR accused Araneta, who was chairman of 
the joint venture’s three-person board, of transferring key assets from the joint 
venture to his family members, leaving ATR with only a ten percent stake in a 
worthless company.118 The plaintiffs alleged that the other two directors breached 
their duty to monitor by permitting Araneta to transfer the joint venture’s assets.119 
Vice Chancellor Strine called them “stooges for Araneta.”120 They did not hold board 
meetings, they did not question changes made to the company name, they allowed 
themselves to be removed from the board without explanation, and they possessed 
little knowledge of the company’s activities.121
 Describing Araneta as a Caremark claim is awkward. In citing to Caremark, 
however, Strine characterized the defendants’ failure to carry out their basic board 
responsibilities as a failure to implement a reporting system.122 But the Araneta case 
had nothing to do with a reporting system. It had to do with board members who 
showed themselves to be incapable of independent thought, judgment, or initiative. 
Araneta was about an extreme set of facts, leaving unanswered whether the duty to 
112. 953 A.2d 136, 139 (Del. 2008). The appeal followed a dismissal of the complaint by the Court of 
Chancery. Id. at 140.
113. Id. at 142. As in Desimone, the court criticized the plaintiff in Wood for not conducting a sufficient 
factual investigation to plead sufficient facts to support his monitoring claim. Id. at 143.
114. Id. at 142–43.
115. Id. at 143–44.
116. No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006).




121. Id. at *20.
122. Araneta, 2006 WL 3783520, at *19.
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monitor has any impact on directors who are more careful in carrying out their basic 
responsibilities.
 Another case, American International Group v. Greenberg, focused on a series of 
fraudulent schemes perpetrated by AIG officers.123 Vice Chancellor Strine decided 
that two of the defendants, who served as directors and officers of the company, 
“knowingly tolerat[ed] inadequate internal controls and knowingly fail[ed] to monitor 
their subordinates’ compliance with legal duties.”124 Strine inferred defendants’ 
knowledge from their positions in the company (“top dog[s]”125), making it unlikely 
that illegal transactions could have been conducted without their knowledge.126
 Although the plaintiffs provided no evidence that the defendants had direct 
knowledge of the fraudulent transactions, Strine was willing to draw such inferences 
for two reasons. First, he was horrified by the magnitude and consistency of the 
fraudulent conduct carried out by the corporation, going so far as to describe the 
defendants as being part of a “criminal organization.”127 It was unbelievable to him that 
such extensive fraud could take place without some knowledge by the defendants.
 Second, the defendants were not only directors but also senior officers of the 
corporation.128 In discussing each defendant’s role in the corporation, Strine noted 
that the defendants directly controlled the corporate divisions involved in the fraud 
and illegal activities.129 Not surprisingly, the strength of the control made it easier for 
the court to infer the existence of knowledge. Such inference would be unlikely in 
the case of outside directors, who do not commonly exercise such control. Given the 
unusual facts of the AIG case, Strine’s willingness to enforce the duty to monitor by 
drawing inferences of directors’ knowledge of wrongdoing will likely not be repeated 
in many other cases.
 The other case to excuse demand for a Caremark claim was In re Countrywide 
Financial Corp. Derivative Litigation.130 Countrywide was a decision of the U.S. 
District Court of the Central District of California.131 The plaintiffs in Countrywide 
sought to hold various directors of Countrywide Financial responsible for approving 
an increase in the origination of non-conforming loans, extension of loans in 
contravention of company underwriting standards, and a failure to maintain 
123. 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009).
124. Id. at 799.
125. Id. at 797.
126. Id. at 796–99.
127. Id. at 798–99.
128. Id. at 774.
129. E.g., Amer. Int’ l Group, 965 A.2d at 797 (“Similarly, given Matthews’s sensitive position and overall 
power and inf luence within AIG, I cannot assume at this stage in the litigation that AIG Financial 
Products, a subsidiary under Matthews’s supervision, took part in a scheme to collude with competitors 
in rigging markets without Matthews knowing about it.”).
130. 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
131. Id.
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appropriate reserves and allowances to offset the company’s riskier loan portfolio.132 
Like the Citigroup board, the Countrywide board approved a strategy and a set of 
business practices that exposed the firm to greater risk.133
 The plaintiffs argued that the Countrywide directors violated section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as their duty to monitor under Delaware 
law.134 Scienter is an element of both claims, but the scienter standard in federal 
securities law is broader than that of Delaware fiduciary law.135 Most federal courts 
have held, as the court in Countrywide did, that recklessness constitutes scienter for 
purposes of Exchange Act section 10(b) and SEC rule 10b-5 liability.136 A showing 
of reckless indifference alone, however, is insufficient to satisfy the scienter 
requirement to show lack of good faith under Delaware law.137 The court in 
Countrywide did not acknowledge any possible difference and applied the same 
scienter standard in evaluating both the federal and state law claims.138
 The effect of the court’s application of the broader federal standard of scienter is 
apparent in how the court evaluated the plaintiffs’ duty to monitor claim. Rather than 
demanding that the plaintiffs present facts demonstrating actual knowledge by the 
directors of the wrongful acts conducted by the officers and employees of the company, 
the court instead inferred directors’ knowledge from their positions on at least one of the 
key board committees “charged with oversight of Countrywide’s risk exposures, 
investment portfolio, and loan loss reserves. As such, they were in a position to recognize 
the significance of these red flags, and, accordingly, investigate the extent to which 
underwriting standards had been abandoned.”139 In short, the court held that because it 
was their job to know, the directors should have known of the violations, or were at least 
reckless in not knowing. The court was convinced that the board’s failure to prevent the 
violation of the company’s underwriting standards “simply d[id] not square with the 
specific and comprehensive monitoring duties assigned to the members of the Board.”140
132. Id. at 1050–51.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1056.
135. Id. at 1056–57.
136. James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman & Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation: Cases 
and Materials 673–74 (6th ed. 2009); In re Countrywide Derivative Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1057 
(C.D. Cal. 2008).
137. E.g., McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1274–75 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
138. In re Countrywide, 554 F.Supp. 2d at 1077 (“Thus, the standard for holding a director liable for a failure 
of monitoring is a ‘scienter’-based one. The finding of a strong inference of at least deliberate recklessness 
in [the discussion of scienter under Section 10(b)], applies equally to the analysis of the failure of 
oversight claims.” (citation omitted)).
139. Id. at 1062 (footnote omitted). The court specifically identified the relevant board committees to be the 
Audit & Ethics Committee, the Credit Committee, the Finance Committee, and the Operations & 
Public Policy Committee. Id. at 1062 n.13.
140. Id. at 1065 (“The purpose of the [Board] Committee system is to monitor the operation, financial 
performance, and risk position of the Company.”). The court in Countrywide also cited for support the 
First Circuit decision in Miss. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 75, 90–91 (1st 
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 Also striking is that the federal court was willing to conclude that the directors 
failed to act in the face of red f lags because there was a public report condemning the 
type of lending practice engaged in by Countrywide, and because competing lenders 
reported distress during the same period.141 Such events are analogous to the events 
that took place prior to the near failure of Citigroup, where both well-publicized 
concerns about the soundness of the mortgage securities and housing markets, as 
well as reports of losses mounting at competing financial institutions existed.142 The 
federal court was happy to make inferences in the absence of actual evidence of 
knowledge in order to uphold a duty to monitor claim that likely would not have 
survived a Delaware court.
 The most important recent case was In Re Citigroup, Inc. Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation, which illustrated the substantive limits of the duty to monitor.143 The 
plaintiffs in Citigroup argued that the board failed to adequately oversee and manage 
the corporation’s risk exposure and ignored several red f lags that warned of the 
deteriorating subprime mortgage market.144
 Chancellor Chandler rejected the plaintiffs’ claims on two grounds. First, a board 
should not be held liable for failure to monitor business risk.145 Chandler held that 
Delaware’s duty to monitor required only that a board implement oversight programs 
to monitor corporate activities for fraud or illegal conduct, and that to extend the duty 
to monitor to business risk would encroach on a board’s business judgment.146
 Second, a board cannot be held liable for making business decisions that later 
prove to have been unwise.147 Expanding the duty to monitor to hold boards 
responsible for bad business outcomes would place the court in the inappropriate 
position of second guessing the business judgment of the board.148 Doing so would 
undermine the purpose of the business judgment rule, which is “to allow corporate 
managers and directors to pursue risky transactions without the specter of being held 
Cir. 2008). In re Countrywide, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1065. In Boston Scientific, the federal court not only 
inferred scienter, but also inferred the existence of a highly effective internal control and information-
reporting system because the company operated in a highly regulated industry. Boston Scientific, 523 
F.3d at 90–91. Such leaps of logic would be unheard of in a Delaware court.
141. See In re Countrywide, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
142. See supra Part I.
143. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
144. Id. at 114–15, 126–27. 
145. Id. at 124–26. Chandler suggested that it is possible, under some set of facts, that directors may breach 
their duty to monitor by failing to monitor the corporation’s business risk, but Chandler offered no 
example of when such a situation would occur. See id. at 126. He admitted that the presumption of the 
business judgment rule, the protection of DGCL section 102(b)(7), and the difficulty in proving a 
Caremark claim place “an extremely high burden on a plaintiff to state a claim for personal director 
liability for a failure to see the extent of a company’s business risk.” Id. at 125.
146. Id. at 129–31.
147. Id. at 130.
148. Id. at 124–26.
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personally liable if those decisions turn out poorly.”149 In addition, evaluating the 
board’s success at monitoring business risk would mean judging the merits of a 
business decision after the fact. Chandler noted that such an evaluation would 
unleash the dangers of hindsight bias (i.e., “the tendency for [someone] with 
knowledge of an outcome to exaggerate the extent to which they believe that outcome 
could have been predicted”).150
 Chandler’s reasoning raises questions about the internal consistency of the duty 
to monitor. First, it is unclear why business risk should be treated differently from 
legal risk. Both types of risk are part of managing the business enterprise.151 It seems 
fantastic that the duty to monitor requires boards to ensure corporate legal compliance 
but also incentivizes boards to take no responsibility for the business results of the 
company—a complete disregard for the principle that the corporation shall be 
managed by or under the direction of the board.
 Second, Chandler justified not extending the duty to monitor to include business 
risk by concluding that extending the duty would undermine the protection of the 
business judgment rule. His reasoning, however, indicates an overly narrow 
interpretation of the duty to monitor. The duty to monitor, as noted by Chancellor 
Allen in Caremark, pertains to unconsidered inaction—action that does not result 
from a decision of the board.152 In Citigroup, the board made a decision that ultimately 
led to investment losses that threatened the firm’s solvency. The plaintiffs, however, 
sought to characterize the board’s behavior as a failure to monitor because the board 
did not appear to monitor the progress of the investment strategy after its original 
authorization. Thus, contrary to Chandler’s holding, the issue was not whether the 
board exercised good business judgment—that is not for a court to decide—but 
whether the board exercised any judgment since the original decision. When a board 
fails to follow up on a past decision and ignores developments that may reveal a 
corporate strategy to be f lawed, the outcome should be considered the result of 
unconsidered inaction. That is why Citigroup should have been a duty to monitor case.
149. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holders Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2008); see also Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“It is a presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”). 
150. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124, n.50 (citation omitted).
151. See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996):
 In light of these developments, it would . . . be a mistake to conclude that [the] Supreme 
Court’s statement in Graham concerning “espionage” means that corporate boards may 
satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation, without 
assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the organization 
that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the board itself 
timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within 
its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law 
and its business performance.
 Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 968.
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iii. COnCLUsiOn
 Risk management is a corporate governance problem. Corporate officers and 
employees make decisions every day that put the corporation at risk. A careful balance 
must be struck between encouraging officers and employees to take chances to grow 
the business and exploit new opportunities, and the need for control and supervision 
by the board to ensure that risks are taken in an appropriate and reasoned manner. 
The catastrophic losses recently suffered by several large financial institutions remind 
us that there are downside risks that need to be managed and spur us to ask whether 
our corporate governance laws have struck the right balance.
 Courts, especially the Delaware courts, play a crucial role in adjusting this 
balance. Courts need to be better aware of the expectations of shareholders, regulators, 
and directors themselves about how risks should be taken and managed. Courts 
should study the director-officer relationship and recognize how important it is for 
boards to make the effort to collect the right type of information about the corporation 
and be prepared to question and probe the risk perceptions of the officers.153 
Strengthening the fiduciary duty to monitor is crucial to that task.154
 Delaware courts have tremendous influence over prevailing corporate governance 
practices.155 Opinions and commentary by judges develop and define norms and best 
practices that affect director behavior, often more so than the threat of legal liability.156 
Judges should begin speaking out about the importance of a board’s duty to monitor 
and to back up their exhortations by expanding the scope and application of the duty 
to monitor in future cases. 
153. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended 
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797, 803 (2001) (noting that officers’ risk 
perceptions tend to be tainted by an optimistic bias).
154. The recognition of the importance of the board to serve as monitor and the failure of securities law to 
ensure that boards are kept fully informed of the operations of the corporation have driven others also 
to look to fiduciary duties to force internal disclosure of information. Donald Langevoort, for example, 
argues for the enforcement of a “duty of candor” on executive officers to report information upward to 
the board. See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and 
Knowledge, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1187, 1190 (2003).
155. See Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware 
Corporation Law, 4 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 333, 354 (2009). Others have also commented on how decisions 
and commentary by judges change board behavior. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director 
Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 403, 442 (2001); Edward 
B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing 
Corporation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1619, 1695–96 (2001); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does 
Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009, 1015 (1997).
156. See, e.g., Myron T. Steele & J.W. Verret, Delaware’s Guidance: Ensuring Equity for the Modern Witenagemot, 
2 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 189 (2007) (analyzing the inf luence of Delaware judges’ extrajudicial activities on 
corporate law and norms); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware 
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A retrospective of Some Key Developments, 153 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1399, 1404, 1407 (2005) (arguing that “ judges have had a substantial role in shaping best practices 
in corporate governance” and “speeches and articles by Delaware judges are often helpful in guiding 
boards and their counsel in the direction of best practices”).
